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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
EDGAR JEFFRIES, : Case No. 20080009-SC 
Defendant/ Appellant. : 
SUPPLEMENTAL REPLY BRIEF 
Defendant/Appellant Edgar Jeffries submits this Supplemental Reply Brief 
together with the original briefs filed on his behalf on appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
A. SHEETROCK PACKAGED TO RESEMBLE CRACK COCAINE IS AN 
IMITATION SUBSTANCE. 
This case concerns two separate acts in the criminal code: the counterfeit provi-
sions in the Controlled Substances Act, and the Imitation Controlled Substances Act. See 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-2, 58-37-8 (2007); id at §§ 58-37b-l to -8 (2007). Both acts 
criminalize distribution or delivery of a fake substance. The counterfeit provisions make 
the offense a felony, and the imitation provisions make it a misdemeanor. Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (identifying felony); UL_ at § 58-37b-4 (identifying misdemeanor). 
In addition, the felony provisions define a "[counterfeit" as follows: 
(i) any substance or container or labeling of any substance that without 
authorization bears the trademark, trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, 
number, device, or any likeness of them, of a manufacturer, distributor, or 
1 
dispenser other than the person or persons who in fact manufactured, distributed, 
or dispensed the substance which falsely purports to be a controlled substance 
distributed by, any other manufacturer, distributor, or dispenser; or 
(ii) any substance that is represented to be a controlled substance. 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2(l)(i). The misdemeanor provisions define an imitation as "a 
substance that is not a controlled substance or counterfeit controlled substance, and which 
by overall dosage unit substantially resembles a specific controlled substance in 
appearance, including its color, shape, or size." hL at § 58-37b-2(3). 
Jeffries has endeavored to distinguish between the counterfeit and imitation 
provisions. He maintains the counterfeit provisions apply to any substance purported to 
be from a manufacturer, distributor, or dispenser, whether the substance contains false 
markings or the like under the first part of the definition (§ 5 8-3 7-2( 1 )(i)(i) (relying on 
false branding)), or no markings under the second part of the definition (§ 58-37-
2(l)(i)(ii) (relying on representations)). Also, he maintains the imitation provisions apply 
when the substance at issue is not a controlled or counterfeit substance, but is made 
specifically to appear as a controlled substance in terms of packaging and dosage unit, 
including color, shape, or size. Utah Code Ann. § 58-37b-2(3). Based on those 
distinctions, distribution or delivery of sheetrock made to resemble a $20 dosage unit of 
crack cocaine qualifies as an imitation. See icL_ at §§ 58-37b-2(3); 58-37b-4; Carter v. 
Univ. of Utah Med. Center, 2006 UT 78, ^  9, 150 P.3d 467 (stating "'the provision more 
specific in application governs over the more general provision'") (citation omitted); (see 
also Supp. Br. of Appellant; Br. of Appellant, Arg. A.) 
Jeffries's analysis has relied on the rules of statutory construction, including the 
2 
plain language of the statutes, definitional provisions, and the principle that the legis-
lature has used terms in each provision advisedly. (Br. of Appellant, 6-13 (cites omitted)). 
Under the rules of construction, a court will interpret statutes in "'harmony with other 
provisions,5" and so that "cno part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant 
and so that one section will not destroy another.'" (Id., 8 (cites omitted)). In addition, 
this Court has relied on the doctrine of ejusdem generis, where a general phrase in a 
statutory provision is not construed in its broadest context, but is applied in harmony with 
the specific terms preceding it. See Monty v. The Sandy City Recorder. 2005 UT 41, ^ 
39,122 P.3d 521; Kilpatrickv. Bulloush Abatement Inc.. 2008 UT 82, % 33, 199 P.3d 
957 (stating a general term should be given a meaning analogous to the specific terms); 
InreOuestarGasCo.. 2007 UT 79, \ 54, 175 P.3d 545 (same); (Br. of Appellant, 8-19; 
Supp. Br. of Appellant, 5). "Legislatures use this common drafting technique to save the 
legislature the time and effort of spelling out every possible situation in which the statute 
could apply." State v. Quintana, 748 N.W.2d 447, 456 (Wis. 2008). 
Application of the rules of construction supports that the legislature intended a 
counterfeit to target those who falsify patented- or pharmaceutical-type drugs (with or 
without false markings), and present them as legitimate to lawful consumers and other 
users. (See Supp. Br. of Appellant). That interpretation distinguishes a counterfeit from 
an imitation. Indeed, an imitation substance "is not a . . . counterfeit controlled sub-
stance." Utah Code Ann. § 58-37b-2(3). It is not concerned with false patented- or 
pharmaceutical-type drugs. Instead, an imitation qualifies as such based on appearance 
where it resembles a specific controlled substance. Id/, (Supp. Br. of Appellant, Arg. A.) 
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In its brief, the State acknowledges the dangers of real and counterfeit drugs. (Re-
placement Br. of Appellee, 11-13). Jeffries does not dispute the dangers. In fact, the 
legislature has recognized that counterfeits present real harms to society, and it has 
treated counterfeits and controlled substances without distinction. See Utah Code Ann. § 
58-37-8(1) (penalizing conduct for controlled or counterfeit substances equally). 
In addition to being dangerous, a counterfeit is a fraud on legitimate manufacturers 
and distributors. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(3)(a)(iv) (making it a crime for a 
person to possess a "punch, die, plate, stone, or other thing designed" to make a counter-
feit). Also, both controlled and counterfeit substances are subjected to the drug stamp tax 
act. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-19-102(1), 59-19-103(1) (2006) (defining "[controlled 
substances" under the drug stamp tax act as "real or counterfeit" substances). 
On the other hand, sheetrock packaged as cocaine does not qualify as a controlled 
or a "counterfeit controlled substance." Utah Code Ann. § 58-37b-2(3) (defining 
imitation substance). Nevertheless, its appearance resembles a specific substance and it 
is a step in drug trafficking; thus, it is an imitation. Id:, see also State v. HilL 688 P.2d 
450, 452 (Utah 1984) (stating that exchanging baking soda for money is distribution of an 
imitation substance);1 see also State v. Nelson, 2007 UT App 34, H 12, 157 P.3d 329 
1
 The State claims Hill is irrelevant because it was decided in 1984. (Replacement 
Br. of Appellee, 23-25). At that time, the definition for a counterfeit was contained in a 
single provision with two parts. The first part of the definition dealt with substances 
bearing unauthorized markings, and the second part dealt with markings and substances 
"represented" to be controlled. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2(23) (Supp. 1983). 
In addition, in 1984 an imitation was defined as a substance represented to be a 
controlled substance, or a substance "resembl[ing] a specific controlled substance in 
appearance." HilL 688 P.2d at 451. In HilL the Court ruled that baking soda 
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(stating defendant's conduct fell within the imitation provisions where he prepared 
pesticide in plastic bags to trick narcotics thieves into stealing pesticide, and police 
testified the pesticide resembled meth in appearance).2 Indeed, a defendant who 
distributes an imitation substance is subject to criminal penalty. See, Utah Code Ann. §§ 
58-37b-2(2); 58-37b-4 (criminalizing all aspects of trafficking in imitation substances). 
Notably, imitation substances - and sheetrock chunks - are not subject to a stamp tax. 
See Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-19-102(1), 59-19-103(1). 
While the State has cited to the rules of statutory construction (see Replacement 
Br. of Appellee, 6-7), it disregards their application for the counterfeit and imitation 
provisions. It seems to claim that the second part of the counterfeit definition may be 
construed without regard to other provisions where it is "self-contained," "broad," and 
"independent." (See id., 19). Also, it rejects the doctrine of ejusdem generis and claims 
it applies only if statutory language is ambiguous or confusing. (Id., 17-18). Yet Utah 
law does not support the State's claims. The doctrine of ejusdem generis is a "basic prin-
ciple" of construction. Mouty, 2005 UT 41, f 39. It takes the plain language of a statute 
into consideration, gives credence to the terms the legislature has used, brings general 
language in harmony with related specific provisions, and interprets statutory language to 
ensure that no other provisions are nullified, destroyed, or rendered superfluous or insig-
nificant. See State v. Moreno, 2009 UT 15, f 10, 203 P.3d 1000 (identifying the rules of 
"sufficiently resembled cocaine" to constitute an imitation substance. IcL at 452. The 
case is pertinent for that ruling. 
2
 The State discounts the relevance of Nelson. (Replacement Br. of Appellee, 25-
26). Jeffries has replied to the State in his original Reply Brief of Appellant, at 7 n.2. 
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construction); Ouestar Gas Co., 2007 UT 79, | 54 (interpreting specific and general 
language for consistency). Ejusdem generis applies here. (See Supp. Br. of Appellant). 
In addition, the State has rejected legislative history. (See Replacement Br. of 
Appellee, 17). Yet Jeffries has cited to the history only to support an otherwise proper 
concept under the rules of construction: that is, statutory provisions must be construed to 
avoid duplication. (See Supp. Br. of Appellant, 7-8); Ariz. Dept. of Revenue v. Action 
Marine, Inc., 181 P.3d 188, 190 (Ariz. 2008) (stating statutes must be construed to avoid 
interpretations that render provisions duplicative); Mortensen v. Heritage Mut. Ins. Co., 
590 N.W.2d 35, 39 (Iowa 1999) (avoiding duplication in statutory interpretation). 
Moreover, if this Court determines that it may consider legislative history and 
ejusdem generis only if a provision is ambiguous, the State's analysis provides that 
ambiguity. The State has interpreted the second part of the counterfeit provision to apply 
to "any substance" "described," "presented," or "put forward" through "words or con-
duct" as a controlled substance. (Replacement Br. of Appellee, 9; see id^, 15 (stating the 
second part of the counterfeit definition "reach[es] any other substances trafficked as 
controlled substances")). That interpretation would serve to nullify the first definition for 
counterfeit, which involves conduct in the form of unauthorized markings from a par-
ticular manufacturer, distributor or dispenser.3 See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2(l)(i)(i). 
3
 The State attempts to distinguish between the first and second parts of the 
definition for counterfeit by claiming the two parts require the State to present different 
amounts of proof. (See Replacement Br. of Appellee, 14-16). That claim is nonsensical. 
Both parts of the definition require evidence of (1) the substance and (2) falsity. Under 
the first part of the definition, falsity may be established with unauthorized markings and 
evidence that the defendant held out the substance as manufactured by another. Under 
6 
Likcuisi (lie State's 1 i ii.nl intnpu'lfitmii fin i inula tnt undn t IK* sn in I p in I i if 
the definition renders the Imitation Controlled Substances Act meaningless. Specifically, 
where the State s interpretation includes presenting a substance as controlled through 
i oiulu\ I th.'il dMinilion nrrrssnnh irr ih i" i iihstancv (In if i in ml h 'Yesembk'l | n 
specific controlled substance" in appearance as defined by § 58~37b-2(3). 
In short, the State fails to read the second part of the counterfeit definition "in 
l iarnmn i l h n l h r i pn >\ i i in i i iiiin tl ir same statnh1 in I iiillli itln i 1;ti111« lunula lln iiiinn 
and related chapters."5 Moreno, 2009 UI 15, Tf 10 (citation omitted). It makes no effort 
to ensure that the counterfeit provisions do not render other statutes "'inoperative or 
lupu'lliiuiji mi I i insignificant. Brickyard Homeowners Ass n v. Oibbons Realty 
Co., 668 P.2d 535, 538 (Utah 1983) (citation omitted). The State's interpretation is 
unavailing. The trial court relied on the State's interpretation in this case. (R. 142:35). 
Thai i\Lt' iinprnprr and eompcL re\ ensaJ ol the trial court s ruling. 
B. THE SHONDEL/WILLIAMS DOCTRINE SUPPOkIS PROCEEDING Wl I H 
THIS CASE UNDER THE MISDEMEANOR PROVISIONS. 
In the event the counterfeit provisions may be construed to apply broadly to any 
)iihsl iiuiv (hat i la'iilbrd piesaitul r "put Ini • mill lliiiii mi III uud m innlu L1 
db controlled (see Replacement Br. of Appellee, 9 (defining counterfeit)), in that instance, 
a substance put forward through packaging and appearance as a controlled substance 
i ^ institutes cumin l.amllln il< luuljnir llui uumleilcil and iniilation ait indistinguishable. 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37b-2(3) (defining imitation); (see also Replacement \\\ A 
the second part of the definition (where there are no markings) falsity may be established 
with representations. 
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Appellee, 15 (claiming the counterfeit definition reaches "any" substance trafficked as 
controlled)). Thus, in that instance, both the counterfeit and imitation provisions contain 
identical elements for the crime of distribution. The elements are as follows: the 
defendant (1) knowingly and intentionally4 (2) delivered (3) a counterfeit/imitation 
substance as a controlled substance. (See, e.g.. Replacement Br. of Appellee, 32-33). 
Notwithstanding the State's broad definition for a counterfeit, it claims the final 
element for the counterfeit crime and the imitation crime is distinguishable. (Replace-
ment Br. of Appellee, 33-34). The State claims the counterfeit provisions require proof 
that "the substance was 'represented to be' a controlled substance," while the "imitation 
controlled substance crime does not." (Id., 33). That assertion is irrelevant in light of the 
State's argument for broad application of the counterfeit provisions. (See id., 9). 
Specifically, if a substance is packaged to "resemble[] a specific controlled substance," 
4
 The State asserts that recklessness is a proper mental state for distribution of an 
imitation substance, and it cites to general language at Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-102 (West 
2004). (Replacement Br. of Appellee, 33 n.3). Yet the imitation provisions specifically 
define the term "[distribute" to mean "actual, constructive, or attempted" delivery. Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37b-2(2). Under Utah law, actual, constructive, or attempted conduct 
involves intentional and knowing conduct. (Supp. Br. of Appellant, 11-12). Thus, reck-
lessness is not a proper mental state here. Indeed, the specific provision contained in the 
Imitation Controlled Substances Act "'governs over the more general'" provision set 
forth at § 76-2-102. See Carter, 2006 UT 78, | 9 (specific governs over general). 
In addition, the Imitation Controlled Substances Act should be read to avoid 
unconstitutional applications. See, e.g.. Village of Hoffman v. Fliyside, Hoffman Estates, 
Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 506 (1982) (construing an ordinance that makes it "unlawful for any 
person" to sell items "designed or marketed for" illegal drugs without a license); id_ at 
500-02 (ruling the ordinance is not vague; and construing the "designed . . . for" language 
to involve the principle intent of the designer, and the "marketed for" language to require 
"scienter" and to "describe^ a retailer's intentional" and deliberate conduct). In that 
regard, a person manufacturing or distributing a bag of flour that looks like cocaine is not 
guilty of a crime unless she intends the flour to be passed off as cocaine. Only then is the 
conduct a step in drug trafficking. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 58-37b-2(3), it is "presented" or "put forw .v ^ .- • .- >lled 
substance through "conduct" (Replacement Br, of Appellee, 9), ieavirm no meaningful 
distinction bet\ v een an ii i litatioi 1 and a • counterfeit substance J- . .;ie n.iai element. 
In addition, the State claims the final element is distinguishable ^wv;- ; *\ Vj-s-
lature has specified that "an imitation controlled substance c 1 s n i • • . t c *, > ii P. 1 c 1 -til 
• • :,M >uui . . . , -J . .K-^ i^Li i ic . . , .. . . . vppciiww,. .. . ^latc .iv»es not explain 
that assertion. (Id., 33-34). Yet, to rive n c m i - * : *' • • • ' J H . - ^ H ; ' • 
sion, the statutes must be constmed to distinguish between the substances. Otherwise, the 
statutes iea\ c u , iiie prosecutor to i k u u i i-v w .-j u c ^ n j a substance. That is, if a 
• ' W ^ - i - K \ ehissif1! i vnlr ( iim r w ,i < i>initorf*'it h a d u s r ii m i \ pi'cst ntal" 
is a controlled substance through "conduct" (Replacement Br. of Appellee, 9 (emphasis 
added)), ie^ packaging to resemble a controlled substance in appearance - the case will 
was presented or put forward through conduct, i.e. packaging to ''resemblefj a specific 
controlled substance in appearance" (Utah Code Ann § 58-37b-2(3) (emphasis added)) 
- *• * , .:e^. riosecutors are 
allowed "'to pursue their personal predilections,'" Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 
358 (1983) (citation omitted), in classifying substances for purposes of felony or 
i i ••, ^ i'•• . ccdifigs ". i «-A .i • - , ;,, j ; mess .;.ai ,N . ;:ejjznto 
5
 Elsewhere in its brief, the State has made reference to a =. :U :-; y or "hierarchy" of 
ciimes - including rape, object rape, and sodomy - where the legislature has specifically 
defined the elements for those crimes, and then has enacted a separate offense (i.e., un-
lawful sexual activity with a minor), which applies "under circumstances not amounting 
9 
our system of law." State v. Bryan. 709 P.2d 257, 263 (Utah 1985); State v. Shondel 453 
P.2d 146, 148 (Utah 1969). 
Finally, the State claims this Court should not consider Utah Code Ann. § 5 8-3 7b-
3 in its analysis. (Replacement Br. of Appellee, 35-36). Section 58-37b-3 states that "[i]f 
the appearance of the dosage unit" is not sufficient to support that a substance is an imita-
tion, the fact finder should consider several factors, including statements, labels, evasive 
tactics, prior convictions and the proximity of the substance to controlled drugs. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37b-3 (connecting the "factors" with the term "and"); Melamed v. 
City of Lorn BeacK 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 729, 735 (Cal. App. 1993) (stating "the word 'and5 
connotes a conjunctive meaning"). This Court may resolve the issue here as set forth in 
the Supplemental Brief of Appellant, and without reference to the factors in § 58-37b-3. 
CONCLUSION 
Jeffries respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial court's ruling on the 
felony charge and remand for further proceedings under the misdemeanor provisions. 
SUBMITTED this ^ ^ day of (^\CUj , 2009. 
Linda M. Jones ^ 
Wesley Howard 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
to" rape, object rape, or sodomy. (Replacement Br. of Appellee, 27 (citing Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 76-5-401 to -413)). The State's references identify the importance of defining 
crimes so they are distinguishable. That is, the first set of crimes must be sufficiently 
defined so that a person is on notice as to when the circumstances do not amount to rape, 
object rape, or sodomy for a charge of unlawful sexual activity with a minor. 
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